Defending Physicalism: Churchland's Response to Jackson's Mary's Room Argument

Tom G. Maier 

Defending Physicalism: Churchland's Response to Jackson's Mary's Room Argument

Frank Jackson’s ‘Mary’s Room’ thought experiment claims to disprove physicalism. Patricia Churchland successfully defends physicalism. In this essay, I will argue that Jackson’s argument is flawed in four key ways: first, it relies on an impossible premise; second, it conflates experiential and learned knowledge; third, it fails to account for comprehensive knowledge of brain states; and lastly, Mary would acquire a new representation of a fact, not new knowledge. 

Impossible Premises:

Mary, a scientist with complete knowledge of brain states, lives in a black and white room until she’s released and experiences color for the first time. Jackson argues that if Mary learns something new from this experience, then consciousness cannot be purely physical, disproving physicalism. Churchland points out a problem with the premises however. Jackson’s Argument assumes that Mary has complete knowledge of brain states. This is a troubling premise because we humans not only do not have complete knowledge of any subject we most certainly lack quite a lot of knowledge regarding brain states. We are not able to consider this impossible premise. We have nothing to say when it comes to perfect knowledge of anything. It is certainly strange that if someone wanted to prove the theory of physicalism then they would use a scenario outside of the physical realm. In the end Jackson’s Argument assumes the ridiculous, unproveable, and the other worldly. One might object that experiments often include unproveable premises, even so, Jackson does not even remain within the bounds he set for himself. Complete knowledge of brain states would entail understanding how each different color would affect her brain, regardless of their experience of said color. Mary then could not have learned something new. 

Knowledge of Data vs Knowledge through Experience: 

Secondly, Churchland argues that Jackson’s Argument fails to prove physicalism wrong because the argument confuses knowledge of data vs the knowledge that comes through experience. Jackson seems to think that knowledge is all the same if he wants to maintain that learning what the color red is vs seeing the color red are the same. Mary would have learned all about the colors and how they affect the brain. She would not have been able to experience said color inside the black and white room, but she would have been able to study the color and know how the color would stimulate her brain. Technically, she would ‘know’ all about the color red; she would never have seen it. That point underlines the important difference between data and knowledge. Knowledge does not always mean experience, for example, one can study the periodic table of elements but one most likely will not experience all of the elements. Still, that person would still be said to ‘know’ the elements. If knowledge does not require experience, then it follows that experience does not require knowledge; for example, the child knows by experience that the stove is hot and he will get burnt if he touches it; however, he may not understand why; hence, his experience trumps his knowledge and he refrains from burning himself. In all, Mary did not learn anything new about red; she merely experienced what red was.  

Interaction vs Acquisition of Knowledge:  

Thirdly, Jackson’s premise presupposes that Mary knows everything about brain states. Jackson claims that Mary, even if she knew what it felt like to see red through study of brain states, would learn something new from seeing red for the first time. However, with perfect understanding of brain states, Mary would be able to distinguish red from yellow. Color experience is the result of specific patterns of brain stimulation. Jackson fails to consider that a physical signal is sent from the retina to the brain, informing the person that they are experiencing red. Notice that said interaction is a physical transaction; Jackson is incorrect to say that such an interaction is the acquisition of new knowledge. If Mary is knowledgeable about brain states, then she would also be aware of the effects of red on the retina.

 Not New Knowledge, just New Representation: 

Lastly, Churchland argues that Mary didn’t acquire new knowledge. If a color-blind person were to experience color for the first time, it would likely be a life-changing event. However, presumably that person did not study brain states extensively in their previous life. What Mary ‘learned’, if one must use that inaccurate term, is what it would feel like to experience red for the first time. She would already know that the said color differs from blue, for instance, because she would have studied how those colors affect her retinas. A person who knows what red will feel like on her retinas cannot be said to have new knowledge regarding the color. That person would merely be presented with a new form of knowledge already possessed. For example, a student can learn a math formula but is not said to have learned something new when they have applied that formula to a scenario.

In conclusion, Jackson’s argument fails to refute physicalism due to several flaws: it relies on impossible premises, ignores other types of knowledge that don’t imply a lack of prior knowledge, conflates experiential and propositional knowledge, and, finally, Mary’s perfect knowledge of brain states would enable her to distinguish colors, making the acquisition of new knowledge impossible. Patricia Churchland’s refutation of “Jackson’s Argument” is successful; she is able to defend physicalism.